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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the rapid growth of this relatively new business and the frequency
with which the lessee finds himself in the position of the plaintiffs
in the two cases noted, the decisions in these- cases allowing recovery
and the bases upon which the cause of action was worked out are
highly significant.
J. C. EAGLES, JR.
Receivers-Enjoining Other Suits-Judgments in
Other Suits as Liens.
An action in the nature of a creditors' bill was brought by a sim-
ple contract creditor against a debtor alleged to be solvent. The
debtor joined in plaintiff's request for the appointment of a receiver.
A receiver was appointed, and the court enjoined further prosecu-
tion of pending suits brought by other creditors. On motion, the
restraining order was vacated and the court ordered that those
creditors who had brought their actions prior to the receivership
proceedings be permitted to proceed to judgment and that their
judgments be claims in the receivership prior to the claims of the
general creditors. Held: The order allowing the priority was correct.1
Generally, an equity court appointing a receiver has inherent
power to protect his possession of the debtor's property. Interfer-
ence with that possession may be enjoined at the time of the appoint-
ment 2 or later upon petition by the receiver in the receivership pro-
ceedings.3 One interfering with his possession is subject to punish-
ment for contempt, and this is true even where there is no in-
junctive order.4 The property is not subject to attachment, 5 gar-
nishment,6 or execution 7 without the consent of the court, but execu-
IDillard v. Walker, 204 N. C. 67, 167 S. E. 632 (1933).
' Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, 58 F. (2d) 1022 (N. D. Ill. 1932).
'Virginia, T. & C. Steel & Iron Co. v. Bristol Land Co., 88 Fed. 134 (C.
C. W. D. Va. 1898) ; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Felton, 103 Fed. 227 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1900); Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Richmond Light &
R. Co., 267 Fed. 493 (E. D. N. Y. 1920).
"In re Marcus, 21 F. (2d) 480 (W. D. Pa. 1924) ; Coker v. Norman, 162
Ga. 351, 133 S. E. 740 (1926).
'Central Trust Co. v. Wheeling .& L: E. R. Co., 189 Fed. 82 (C. C. N. D.
Ohio 1911) ; Carroll v. Cash Mills, 125 S. C. 332, 118 S. E. 290 (1923); see
Ewing v. Ewing Planing Mill, 183 Iowa 711, 167 N. W. 607 (1918).
'Fleeger v. Swift, 122 Kan. 6, 251 Pac. 187 (1926).
"Mercantile Trust Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 79 Fed. 389 (C. C. E.
D. Pa. 1897); Pelletier v. Greenville Lumber Co., 123 N. C. 596, 31 S. E.
855, 68 Am. St. Rep. 837 (1898); see Shapiro v. Wilgus, 55 F. (2d) 234,
235 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931); cf. Meyers v. Washington Heights Land Co.,
107 W. Va. 632, 149 S. E. 819 (1929).
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tion must be allowed when there was a seizure before the receiver's
appointment.8
When a receiver is appointed the courts often in their discre-
tion enjoin further prosecution of pending suits9 or the prosecution
of any suit subsequent to the receivership.' 0 These injunctions may
restrain actions against the debtor" or actions in other courts against
the receiver on causes of action arising before his appointment. 12
A restraining order may also be procured on the receiver's petition
in the receivership suit,13 or in a separate action.14 A state court
may enjoin a suit in another state, 15 and an order of a federal court
may stay proceedings in a state court.' 6
The receiver holds the property of the debtor subject to all valid
liens properly executed and recorded at the time of his appoint-
ment. 17 One who has no lien when the receiver is appointed can-
not thereafter do anything to obtain a lien on the property and
thereby gain a preference over other creditors entitled to share
equitably in the distribution of the estate.' 8 It is specifically held
that after the appointment of a receiver a creditor may not obtain
priority over other creditors by obtaining a judgment against the
debtor.' 9 This is true though such judgment may have been entered
8Duval v. T. P. Ranch Co., 151 La. 142, 91 So. 656 (1922).
9 Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Bagley, 44 F. (2d) 808 (S. D. Cal. 1930).
"Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., 12 F. (2d) 958 (W. D. N. Y. 1926);
In re French, 181 App. Div. 719, 168 N. Y. Supp. 988 (1918).
'In re Yaryan Naval Stores Co., 214 Fed. 563 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914).
"Burke v. Ellis, 105 Tenn. 702, 58 S. W. 855 (1900) ; see Central Trust
Co. of N. Y. v. East Tenn. V. & G. Ry. Co., 59 Fed. 523, 528 (C. C. D. Ky.
1894).
"In re New Jersey Refrigerating Co., 97 N. J. Eq. 358, 127 AtI. 198 (1925).
" Davis v. Butters Lumber Co., 132 S. C. 233, 43 S. E. 650 (1903).
However, it has been held that an injunction will not lie at the instance of
the receiver to enjoin creditors who prior to the receivership proceedings
garnished the funds of the debtor, and that their judgments recovered should
be given priority in the order in which the actions were begun. Rickman v.
Rickman, 180 Mich. 224, 146 N. W. 609 (1914); cf. Roberts v. Letchworth,
127 Ark. 490, 192 S. W. 375 (1917) (one appointed receiver cannot continue at-
tachment suit against deotor but must suspend suit and present claim for al-
lowance).
" Davis v. Butters Lumber Co., supra note 14.
' Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Bagley, supra note 9; cf. Riehle v. Mar-
golies, 279 U. S. 218, 49 Sup. Ct. 310, 73 L. ed. 669 (1929).
" Vanderwall v. Vanco Dairy Co., 200 N. C. 314, 156 S. E. 512 (1931) ; see
In re K-T Sandwich Shoppe of Akron, Inc., 34 F. (2d) 962, 963 (N. D. Ohio
1929).
" New York v. Maclay, 53 Sup. Ct. 323, 77 L. ed. (Advance Opinions) 416
(1933) ; see It re K-T Sandwich Shoppe of Akron, Inc., .supra note 17.
" Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., supra note 10; Britten v. Sheridan Oil Co.,
205 Iowa 147, 217 N. W. 800 (1928) ; Ex parte International Harvester Co.,
137 S. C. 124, 134 S. E. 530 (1926).
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by leave of court,20 or the suit in which it was rendered was begun
before the receiver was appointed and took possession.2 1 The cred-
itor gets no lien when his judgment was not actually entered of
record or registered until after the appointment of the receiver,22
and such a judgment cannot be made a lien by entry -nunc pro tunc
as of a time before the appointment. 23 But the creditors may ac-
quire such judgment liens in the case of a receivership pendente lite
where the sole purpose is to preserve the property, or collect income
from it, such as a receivership in a mortgage foreclosure, 24 as dis-
tinguished from a receivership for the general administration of
the debtor's assets.
The court in the principal case was content to say that judg-
ments are liens and as such are given priority under the statute.2 5
This evades the question whether prosecution of the suits to judg-
ment should have been enjoined, and evades also the general rule
that the usual statutory priority of judgment creditors is absent
when their judgments are entered after a receiver is appointed. In
an earlier North Carolina decision the court in a well reasoned
opinion specifically considered the latter problem and reached the
result that a creditor who had begun a suit against a corporation be-
fore a receiver was appointed could hot by prosecuting the action
to judgment after the appointment obtain a lien and thereby gain
a preference over the general creditors.26
JULE MCMICHAEL.
t Cowan v. Pa. Plate-Glass Co., 184 Pa. 1, 38 Atl. 1075 (1898).
'Lang v. Macon Construction Co., 101 Ga. 343, 28 S. E. 860 (1897) ; Odell
Hardware Co. v. Holt-Morgan Mills, 173 N. C. 308, 92 S. E. 8 (1917).
'Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch. 270, 125 Atl. 343 (1924).
' Odell Hardware Co. v. Holt-Morgan Mills, supra note 21.
Johnson v. Garner, 233 Fed. 756 (D. Nev. 1916).
Where a receiver was appointed in a mortgage foreclosure it was held
that creditors were entitled to sue at law and by judgments acquire a pref-
erence, but not after the court amended its decree and took steps to distribute
the property among the creditors. Moore v. Southern States Land & Timber
Co., 83 Fed. 399 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1896).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §614.
Odell Hardware Co. v. Holt-Morgan Mills, supra note 21. True, this
case was decided under the statute relating to corporations. N. C. CODE ANN.(Michie, 1931) §1210. But the same statute would apparently apply to re-
ceivers of other insolvent debtors. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §860:
"The article Receivers, in the chapter entitled Corporations, is applicable, as
near as may be, to receivers appointed hereunder."

